FOREIGN BACKERS, DOMESTIC DISSENT, AND REGIME POLICY IN JORDAN: EXPLAINING REPRESSION-ACCOMMODATION DECISIONS:

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Introduction:
Among the disparate directions taken by international relations theory and conflict studies has been an interest in linkages between domestic and international politics (e.g., Peter Gourevitch’s ‘Second-Image Reversed’ (Gourevitch, 1986), Tilly’s notion of ‘war-making and state-making’ (Tilly, 1978), David’s ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’ (David, 1991), and the literature on revolution and war) This has been partially a reaction to the black-boxing of the state prevalent in some ‘realist’ analyses. The research proposed in this paper examines the impact of major shocks in the international environment on regime domestic policy towards dissidents. It is assumed that rather than simple repression or accommodation, regime policy is a complex mixture of the two. Further, repression and accommodation are typically variably distributed across dissidents. Regimes’ policies tend to exhibit substantial continuity in some periods and major shifts in other periods. This paper will seek to demonstrate that regime-dissident relations are not best described as exclusively or primarily a domestic story. Rather, international shocks provide significant explanations for major changes in regime policy toward dissidents.

Some Related Theory:
I follow Brian Ames (1987) in defining a regime as a given set of institutional relationships. Each regime can consist of one or more administration sharing a common set of institutional relationships. The name of the chief executive can be associated with the administration, and the ‘inevitable differences and disagreements’ occurring between chief executives and their closest advisers is simply ignored (1987: 2). This way we can focus on the efforts of chief executives to hold on to their jobs as a reference point for our analyses of policy decisions.

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Regimes react to threats to survival. In a third world context, survival means a tangibly different thing than political survival in an established democracy: whereas in a stable democracy, a losing incumbent is likely to be able to earn money on the lecture and talk-show circuit, in the Third World, losing office can mean imprisonment, persecution, torture, and execution. For the universe of cases I am speaking to—countries lacking stable and enduring political systems—my assumption follows David: ‘leaders are weak and illegitimate and (...) the stakes for domestic politics are very high’ (David: 1991: 237). While internal threats are much more likely to challenge a leader’s hold on power than direct challenges to the regime from other states (David, 1991: 238), I argue that major changes in the international environment can operate on the internal threats to a regime’s survival, through direct foreign backing of domestic dissidents, demonstration effects, or other influences.

Policies of repression and accommodation are survival strategies. From the theory that we have, it is not always obvious when repression will be chosen over accommodation as both are potential survival tactics in the regime’s policy portfolio (and neither is it obvious what particular mix will be chosen). But it is clear that we should expect a regime policy shift of some observable sort when an exogenous shock occurs. The reason for this is that the major exogenous shock certainly affects both the state’s dilemma and the Rebel’s Dilemma.

This may be in terms of increasing or decreasing the likelihood of success, increase the benefits of CA participation, or the rise and shift of external patrons (as possibilities). Thus we presume a certain pre-existing equilibrium, which is disturbed and to which actors react.

This research seeks to illuminate the multiple environments affecting regime and dissident behavior. Ultimately, I have in mind a theoretical model in which I include (in addition to the regime policy) dissident decisions and regime-dissident outcomes. According to Lichbach, the Rebel’s Dilemma and the State’s Dilemma are closely interlinked and part of the strategic struggle between regimes and oppositions. The rebel’s dilemma may be summarized as the collective action problems affecting the conversion of potential participants in collective dissent into actual participants; Lichbach’s work is essentially a catalogue of ‘solutions’ to these problems. The states dilemma is best summarized in a two-pronged fashion. The first prong is the effort of the state to prevent dissidents from finding solutions in overcoming the rebel’s dilemma and achieving successful collective action. The second related prong is the effort of the state is to ensure that supporters engage in supportive collective action when needed.
For this paper, I have in mind a research design that explores the process under which an exogenous change affects the state’s dilemma, and at the same time affects the rebel’s dilemma and causes a change in dissident potential for scale and types of CA, which causes a change in regime policy. The interaction of the regime and dissidents then produces the final societal outcome, which may be in the form of durable institutional changes. If we can identify the conditions under which regime-dissident interactions are likely to produce specific types of enduring institutional changes, we should be able to draw implications for democratization processes. The consequences for institutional evolution may be an unintended consequence of specific types of interactions. However, these wider connections are beyond the scope of this paper.

Lichbach (1995) suggests ‘finding external patrons’ as one solution to the Rebel’s Dilemma of manufacturing successful collective action. The resource-mobilization perspective suggests that access to resources constrains and shapes the possibilities of dissident CA. I argue that part of the explanation for how regimes treat dissidents lies with the behavior of foreign powers. Other states can choose to either do nothing, support the regime, withdraw support from the regime, support dissidents, or withdraw support from dissidents. Of these, the decisions to withdraw support from the regime or extend support to dissidents are unfavorable to the regime insofar as they weaken its position with respect to dissidents. As such, these two changes in external patronage are likely to result in an increase in the threat posed by dissidents to the regime, and lead to a change in regime policy towards dissidents in order to survive. I assume that political actors seek at a minimum to survive, and would ideally prefer not to accommodate any dissident demands; ie., when the resources are available to them, they would prefer to repress. Other things being equal, a regime not confronted by an unfavorable external patron shift is more likely to be able to pursue a policy of repression in response to dissident mobilization (than a regime faced by an unfavorable patron shift).

An example may be a coup in a neighboring state that results in a former ally turning into an enemy. In Lichbach’s terms, this is an example of patronage with a slight twist: an external actor switches patronage favors from the regime to certain dissidents. In other words, it switches from being a regime ally to being a dissident ally. In such a case, the costs to the dissidents of CA become lowered- they have ‘located an external patron’ (Lichbach, 1995: 189, section 6.2.3.4). The regime recognizes this new potential for successful rebel CA and
acts to either coopt the dissidents through accommodation or raise their costs of CA by increasing repression. The regime is more likely to accommodate because the unfavorable external patron shift has made it relatively weak with respect to dissidents.

I will use the idea of equilibrium as a useful metaphor from neoclassical economics. The assumption here is that the normal state of affairs is an equilibrium, i.e., the relations between the regime and dissidents are an ongoing arrangement based on a given set of domestic and international conditions, primarily those related to the availability of resources. In other words, in equilibrium the regime is surviving and making use of a certain policy of repression and accommodation towards domestic dissidents. The equilibrium is disturbed as the conditions on which previous regime survival strategies were predicated become obsolete. The regime then adjusts its policy to the new environmental conditions (and in the wider story, dissidents also adjust) at which point equilibrium is once more restored.

There is also an element of history here that needs to be included here. Our understanding of present regime policy towards specific dissidents must be predicated on some notion of how the regime has reacted to previous shocks and the policies put in place earlier. This is an important qualitative aspect that will receive explicit attention in the qualitative historical accounts of cases. However, because the effort here is to maintain a manageable and focused research question, the carryover of historical policy reactions to previous shocks will not be modeled directly into the research hypothesis.

**Hypothesis:**

Diagrammatically, the hypothesis is summarized below.

external patron shifts unfavorable to regime --> dissident mobilization --> change in repression-accommodation mix used by regime.

Where we expect that a regime weakened by unfavorable patron shifts is more likely to accommodate dissidents, while a regime not similarly weakened is more likely to repress.

More specifically, then, two paths are envisioned:

H1: external patron shifts unfavorable to regime --> dissident mobilization --> change in repression-accommodation mix, primarily increased accommodation
H2: no external patron shifts unfavorable to regime $\rightarrow$ dissident mobilization $\rightarrow$ change in repression-accommodation mix, primarily increased repression.

In terms of limitations of this approach, the hypotheses here do not claim that unfavorable external patron shifts are the sole explanation or even the primary explanation for regime policy shifts; ie, this theory does not claim to explain all policy shifts. However, it does claim that a dissident mobilization, when preceded by an unfavorable external patron shift, is likely to produce a significant accommodative shift in the regime’s policy vis a vis dissidents.

**Research Method:**

The research design will be based on pretest-posttest qualitative comparisons.

**Case selection:**

Four cases of dissident mobilization are chosen because dissident mobilization is the control variable. The Middle East is a highly ‘penetrated’ setting (Brown, 1984), whether the impact of external patrons is likely to be especially strong. If the hypothesis is rejected in the ‘most likely case’, this constitutes a strong rejection; if support is found, this suggests the need to investigate other cases in future research to determine the broader applicability of the hypothesis.

As possibly the most ‘penetrated’ Middle Eastern state, Jordan makes a good test country. In other words, if this hypothesis is going to work, we would expect it to work in a highly penetrated state, ie, one particularly vulnerable to external environmental changes of various sorts. If on the other hand the hypothesis turns out to not work in Jordan then that suggests that the hypothesis will be even less likely to work in less penetrated situations.

If however the hypothesis does work, ie., it seems that unfavorable external patron shifts are clearly followed by policy shifts, then this will provide some supporting evidence for the hypothesis; the next step (in another research paper) would be to look at less penetrated countries to see if the hypothesis holds there as well. Thus, country selection in this research design is based on a ‘most likely case’ principle under which the idea is that if the hypothesis is going to hold anywhere it should most certainly hold in the most likely case, and if it does not hold in the most likely case then that constitutes a strong rejection (Przeworski and Teune, 1970).
It is important to recognize that we need not expect the same degree of vulnerability to external patron shifts in one country over time. It is reasonable to expect that King Hussein is less vulnerable to shocks in the 1980’s and 90’s as compared to the 1950’s when he was younger, inexperienced, and untested. This is an element to be brought out in the qualitative case analyses and is related to the role of history discussed earlier.

The other reason to look at one country over time is that the theory and research hypothesis point to a strong role of history and a nuanced and context-sensitive understanding of policy. Particularly because we have reason to believe that regime policy at time $t$ is likely to affect and have an impact on and inform us about regime policy at future time periods. Across-national study may not be as effective in capturing the historical element.

I will look at the following pieces of Jordanian history

- The period in the 50’s going roughly from 1952-1959.
- The following period, roughly 1960-1965
- The period from roughly 1966-1972
- The later period, roughly 1985-1994

**Variables:**

- External Patron shift unfavorable to the regime.

These are defined as major changes in the policies of other states towards either the regime or dissidents. Either the regime loses a foreign patron, thus weakening its relative to dissident, or dissidents gain a patron, strengthening them with respect to the regime, or both.

- Dissident Mobilization

This is the control variable. All observations on it have to be positive- it has to be present in all the cases. Episodes of “dissident mobilization” are defined as large-scale popular activity; some of these follow a clear ‘protest cycle’ pattern. These are periods and episodes that have received widespread acknowledgment as significant dissident activity.

Changes in the repression-accommodation mix (H1 outcome is increased repression, H2 outcome is increased accommodation).

The outcome this work seeks to explain is ‘policy shifts’ in the repression-accommodation mix used by regimes; a widely-recognized shift in the level of repression or accommodation would constitute
different observations on the dependent variable. Changes in policy are thus divided broadly into more repression or more accommodation. Pretest and Post-test observations on the ‘repression-accommodation’ mix require a description sensitive to the nuances and complexities of regime relations towards a variety of dissident groups. Regime policy is rarely fiat repression or fiat accommodation of all dissidents; some dissidents are sometimes more repressed and others more accommodated. Qualitative case studies help in capturing this complexity and in pointing to significant policy changes. Additionally, part of the expectation with qualitative research is to come up with a way of distinguishing between minor changes in regime strategy and major policy shifts. This will be developed through further familiarity with the cases.

The definition of a policy shift has multiple dimensions; it includes an overall increase or decrease in repression or an across-the-board set of concessions (versus no concessions), which is conceptually different from a regime policy shift in choice of groups to repress or accommodate. This could potentially be measured by annual human rights data from Amnesty international or the CIA Factbook. However, the numbers by themselves would tend to be gross figures and require qualitative interpretation to add subtlety and nuance to our understanding of the actual policy shift. I will therefore present qualitative accounts at which groups the regime chose to repress versus the ones selected for accommodation and shifts in that selection as well. Repression and accommodation are not purely dichotomous, and regime policy will typically be some complex mixture of the two.

At the same time, especially for the purposes of this paper, rather than examining the regime’s policy toward the entire field of dissidents, I will restrict my analysis to regime policy towards certain groups of dissidents. These will be groups that have played a prominent and widely noted role in Jordan’s political history, primarily Arab nationalists and religious fundamentalists of various stripes (Dann, 1989; Mishal, 1978).

Measurement:

Data is taken from qualitative historical accounts produced by various sources, including some journalistic and biographical accounts. Use of aggregated numerical data may be incorporated in future research. For the purposes here, I limit the post-mobilization observations to a 5-year bound on the time period after the patron shift.
and mobilization data. The assumption here is that the causal significance of the patron shift will decrease over time, and is not likely to be a strong explanatory factor beyond five years.

Findings:
Summary of Results:

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<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>High accommodation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Repression/ martial law, relative toleration of onegroup</td>
<td>Doesn't support for H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 60’s</td>
<td>High repression</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>accommodation</td>
<td>Support for H1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 60’s</td>
<td>Relative toleration</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Strong repression</td>
<td>Some support for H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 80’s/early 90’s</td>
<td>Some repression, continued ban on party activity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Strong Accommodation/ Parties legalized</td>
<td>Some support For H1.</td>
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Case: 1952-1959

Background and Pre-mobilization Observations

In Ames (1992) terms this period covers two different administrations under one regime: the monarchical regime persisted but King Talal abdicated, and his son Hussein occupied the throne in May 1953. Under King Abdullah (Hussein’s grandfather), parties were of little significance. In 1952, constitutional changes were made by King Talal (Hussein’s father) (Snow, 1972: 93-94), and these liberalizing changes heightened the role of political parties in Jordanian politics.

Hussein had inherited from his father a partially liberal national political system with a measure of freedom allowing for some organized party activity. He was young and relatively inexperienced as a regime leader. Arab nationalism overshadowed most of the Arab world as a popular political ideology emphasizing themes of anti-colonialism and Arab unity. Anti-monarchical sentiments were strong—the ‘Free Officers’ takeover in 1953, in Egypt, the most populous Arab state’, provided a strong motivating example to activists in other
External Patronage

The Free Officers' coup in Egypt, with the new regime firmly in Nasser's hands by 1954, meant the appearance of an external patron for Jordan's Arab nationalist dissidents. The prevailing ideology through much of the fifties in the Arab world was Qawmiya (nationalism) and it was embodied by the charismatic Nasser. Al-Qawmiyun Al-Arab (the Arab nationalists’ party in Jordan) had developed close relations with Syria and Egypt by the mid-1950s, such that the party was willing to smuggle arms from them to work for the overthrow of the Jordanian regime; moreover Egyptian agents were in contact with party members exchanging information (Mishal, 1978: 94). Egyptian bribes were apparently paid to Jordanian policemen to get them to be gentle and not disperse mobs (Snow, 1972: 78).

The link between Jordan’s oppositionists and the Nasserite Egyptian regime was well established, and in general, the opposition parties tended to subordinate national Jordanian considerations on domestic and foreign policy issued to the interests of Cairo. Nabulsi (...) a prominent nationalist politician who became the Prime Minister in 1956(...) consulted the Egyptian ambassador in Jordan on political matters, and it is even thought in some quarters that he consulted with President Nasir himself (Mishal, 1978: 61). Agitators in Pal refugee camps may have been directed from Egypt (Dann, 1989: 76). There were consistent reports of activity by Egyptian intelligence agents supporting anti-regime nationalist dissidents in Jordan. The exception among the Jordanian dissidents were the Muslim Brotherhood, who were opposed to Nasser's persecution of the Brotherhood parent organization in Egypt.

Additionally, Egyptian propaganda waged a virulent campaign to undermine the shaky legitimacy of the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy. Of particular importance was the influence of Cairo media on the Jordanian public (Snow, 1972: 74) exemplifying the significance of information and propaganda in dissident collective action. Sawt al-Arab (The Arab Voice) was a Egyptian radio station that in particular had a strong influence.

Dissident Mobilization

Some oppositionists landed in Parliament in 1954, even though the elections were reportedly 'arranged'. Riots occurred in Jordanian
with crowds 'openly encouraged by parliamentary opposition'. These were apparently encouraged from unspecified countries outside of Jordan (Snow, 1972: 72).

On December 21, 1955, Hussein dissolved Parliament, an action which the Supreme Court overturned as illegal. Rioting followed in different areas. Hussein then indicated plans to sign the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was a pro-Western Turkey-Iraq alliance (Snow, 1972: 75; Aras, 1997: 51), which had as its rival the Syrian-Egyptian Defence Pact signed in October, 1955. Wars and violent demonstrations immediately broke out (Snow, 1972: 77).

The October 21, 1956 Parliamentary Elections had produced an opposition-dominated Parliament; Suleiman Nabulsi a National Socialist (i.e., oppositionist) became the 'first and last' opposition leader to be elected Prime Minister (Snow, 1972: 100). Demonstrations broke out on April 13-15, 1957 (Snow, 1972: 108-110). An apparent rebellion took place in part of the military. In general, dissident activity reached a peak through the mid-50's and is exemplified by the dramatic events of late 1956 and early 1957.

**Post-mobilization Observations**

In an important concession to Arab nationalists in the military, John Glubb was forced to resign his commanding position in the Jordanian army. Although Glubb had no official commission from Great Britain, his visible role as a British national in charge of an Arab army carried overtones of a colonial holdover and accentuated Jordan's previous and continuing ties with the colonial powers. The practical effect of his removal and the departure of other senior British officers was to give more upward mobility to Arab nationalists in the army.

On October 24, 1956, Hussein signed a military pact with Egypt and Syria, a concessionary move meeting the demands of dissident Arab nationalists. On January 19, 957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria agreed to give Jordan a 10-year subsidy (Snow, 1972: 102). In January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine, an offer of economic aid to Arab states in exchange for combating Soviet influence/Communism, was promulgated (Snow, 1972: 103). Hussein responded favorably to the offer of American aid, confirming his declared rejection of Communism (Hussein, 1962: 101,113).

The Jordanian regime was now in a strengthened position in terms of available resources. The election of 1956 had produced an opposition dominated Parliament. Suleiman Nabulsi was made Prime
Minister as head of the largest Parliamentary grouping (the National Socialists). Nabulsi tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Hussein made a very strong public statement against Communist elements and essentially left Nabulsi with little choice but to resign on April 10, 1957. This was followed by a two-week crisis which is now recounted in different versions as either a coup attempt by the Jordanian ‘Free Officers’ or a purported coup used by Hussein as a policy justification. On April 25, 1957, political parties were banned, martial law was declared, and over the next two days, curfews were imposed (Snow, 1972: 114). In terms of the Jordanian political system, the cabinet was now appointed by and responsible to the King, whereas before it had been responsible to parliament. In May 1957, dozens of political arrests were made (Mishal, 1978: 94).

Hussein had allowed a great measure of parliamentary freedom, affirming the policy started by his father King Talal in 1952. To the extent that the elections of 1956 are frequently described as the most democratic in Jordan’s history. A great degree of legal party activity was allowed. As an accommodation to the populist forces of the time, John Glubb, the British officer who ran the Jordanian army, was dismissed in 1956 along with other British officers in a major concession to Arab nationalists in the army. The imposition of martial law was a very significant policy shift, as it was a move toward large-scale repression after a long period of political liberalism. After the clampdown, other dissidents quieted down, but the Muslim Brotherhood kept up its anti-Western voice (Dann, 1989: 101), and the MB was allowed to function to some degree as a social association. This demonstrated ability of the NIB to retain its status as a coherent social and political organization even in times of severe repression was to become translated several decades later into the ability to mobilize large numbers of Jordanian for mass rallies and organized voting.

The 1950s are a case in Jordanian dissidents, particularly Arab nationalists benefitted greatly from Nasser’s rise in Egypt as a relatively persistent external patron. However, there are three years between Nasser’s rise and Hussein’s imposition of martial law. Dissident activity was high throughout the 50’s in the vulnerable early days of the monarchy, and reached a relative peak in the mid-fifties. Having received confirmed US support under the Eisenhower doctrine, the Jordanian regime shifted from relative political openness to martial law forcing essentially all groups underground except the Muslim Brotherhood, known for its ideological opposition to Nasser.
Implications for the hypothesis:

This case does not support for H1. Egypt emerged as a clear external patron for nationalist dissidents following Nasser’s ascendancy in 1954. Dissident activity reached a peak by the mid-50’s. Hussein offered significant concessions initially (particularly dismissing Glubb and appointing Naboulsi, as oppositionist, to be Prime Minister). However, the significant, lasting shift in regime policy came with the imposition of martial law and the broad repression of almost all dissident political activity. This goes against the claim of the hypothesis that when faced by a dissident mobilization combined with an unfavorable external patron shift, the regime is more likely to accommodate (because in this case, the regime chose to repress). The explanation of this may lie in the Eisenhower doctrine combined with the ‘Arab subsidy’ to Hussein. These pledges of foreign support might have provided the regime with the secure resources it needed to carry out its shift to repression. In effect, the regime managed to ‘locate external patrons’ to counteract the unfavorable patron shift represented by the rise of Nasser. In its present form, the hypothesis does not allow us to model this.

Case: Early sixties.

Background and Pre-mobilization Observations

The martial-law regime continued from 1957 onwards. Wasfi Tall was appointed Prime Minister by the King. In 1962 there were nonparty parliamentary elections. Earlier changes in Parliament and cabinet had been made, moving the system away from the freely elected Parliament.

External Patronage

On February 8, 1963, the Iraqi leader Qasim was toppled by civilian Baathists (Dann, 1989: 127). The Egyptian press predicted Hussein’s downfall. On March 8, 1963, a Baath civilian takeover took place in Syria. On April 17, 1963, a new United Arab Republic was formed, including Iraq this time, in addition to Syria and Egypt, the original members (Dann, 1989: 128). The addition of Iraq to the UAR meant an external patron shift strongly favorable to Jordanian Arab nationalist dissidents, directly through Iraq’s new support for Egypt’s policy of subversion in Jordan, and indirectly through the demonstration effect and the nationalist propaganda fodder that the invigorated UAR became.
**Dissident Mobilization**

On April 17, 1963 rallies supporting unity took place. These were followed on April 20, 1963 by large-scale riots in Jerusalem and Nablus.

**Post-mobilization Observations**

Strong initial moves toward repression of the riots were made: the Jordanian army was sent in to quell the rioters. A policy of repression was reaffirmed with some important new accommodations. Although there was no massive shift in the direction of regime policy toward dissidents as a whole (such as a major shift away from martial law and towards a liberal political system), the resignation on March 27, 1963 of Wasfi Tall, known as a strong Prime Minister willing to repress Palestinian nationalists, was a regime move designed to accommodate preferences of Palestinians. In May 13, 1963, Hussein pardoned by decree ‘a large group of officers and civilians sentenced to long terms for antigovernment activity’, and in 1965 some prominent political exiles were permitted to return to Jordan (Mishal, 1978: 64). Furthermore, the Jordanian regime had earlier resisted official references to the 'Palestinian entity', a slogan propogated by Iraq and Egypt. In the first Arab summit conference, however, Hussein joined a motion recommending the creation of a 'Palestine Liberation Organization' to work for the liberation of the homeland (Mishal, 1978: 65). The April 1967 parliamentary elections (Dann, 1989: 159) produced two MBs and 2 Husayni supporters (Husayni was a prominent Palestinian rival to the Hashemites). The policy shift in the post-test period was in the form of significant new accommodation of Palestinian nationalists.

**Implications for the hypothesis:**

This case provides broad support for the hypothesis. The Iraqi regime change had consequences that meant an unfavorable external patron shift for the Jordanian regime. This was followed by dissident mobilization, particularly in the West Bank. This was followed by a change in the regime’s repression-accommodation mix. As predicted, significant concessions and accommodation of Palestinian nationalists particularly followed.

*Case: Late sixties.*
Background and Pre-mobilization Observations

Palestinians in Jordan had become more militarized over time and increasing fedayeen (guerrilla) raids and armed Palestinian activity took place across the border into Israel. There was some Israeli retaliation costly to Jordan in terms of casualties. In the early sixties, the monarchy tolerated the armed Palestinian presence, but by 1966 had begun severely repressing them all (Mishal, 1978: 71).

External Patronage

A major shock was the 1967 war with Israel. the war was a major defeat for Jordan in terms of territory- the entire West Bank was taken over by Israel. However, this cannot be counted as an external patron shift according to my definition of the term; the Jordanian state did not lose a clear foreign backer and Jordanian dissidents did not gain one.

Dissident Mobilization

The 1967 war lead to the 'emergence of the PLO as an independent factor'; this 'transformation of the PLO was felt most acutely in the refugee camps, whose population rapidly grew in the aftermath of the war when about 300,000 Palestinians fled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Pappe, 1994: 71). The refugees continued to arrive, and in a brief time 'the PLO succeeded in building a state within a state, with adequate medical, educational, and administrative functions', and mounting guerrilla raids against Israel (Pappe, 1994: 72). Thus, the PLO was providing both welfare and warfare services. basic attributes of 'stateness'. This constituted an powerful implicit challenge to the Hashemite monarchy.

The Fedayeen raids continued and the armed, uniformed presence of the Fedayeen was highly visible in Jordan. Finally, in September 1970, 3 airplanes were hijacked and blown up by George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, precipitating the regime’s response.

Post-mobilization Observations

The Jordanian army moved against the Fedayeen in what is often referred to as the Jordanian civil war. The Palestinian side was eventually crushed. The PLO then appeared to win an apparent political victory in the Cairo agreement (September 27, 1970) as Hussein agreed to all-Arab (rather than purely Jordanian) supervision over PLO activities in Jordan. Hussein appointed Wasfi Tall, known for
his stance against Palestinian nationalists, to be Prime Minister in October 1970. Through Tall’s activities, the PLO was expelled from Jordan (Pappe, 1994: 75). Thus, Palestinian dissidents were repressed in Jordan both militarily and politically.

In an interesting example of a ‘disloyal’ external patron, the Iraqi military did not come to the aid of the Palestinian resistance. An Iraqi expeditionary force of 25,000 men was present in Jordan at the time and had earlier pledged itself to support the Palestinians in the event of a regime attack, but failed to carry through on its promise. There were some tactical drawbacks in the Iraqi position and also fears of an active front with Israel (Baram, 1994: 120). Iraq’s rhetoric since the Baath takeover in 1968 was extremely vocal in its support for Palestinian nationalist organizations and in its criticism of the Arab monarchies (Baram, 1994: 119).

Implications for the hypothesis:

The case follows the broad outlines laid out in H2. However, this is qualified support for the hypothesis. The reason is that the 1967 war with Israel, although not an ‘unfavorable external patron shift’, was a major shock to the Jordanian regime. The loss of the West Bank and the sizable influx of refugees clearly increased the resources available to Palestinian dissidents and the threat they posed to the regime. It seems likely that the regime’s move to crush the Palestinians was undertaken when the regime felt that it had secure foreign backers, although at this point I don’t have strong historical data to back up this proposition. If this is indeed the case, then this repressive activity echoes the regime move of 1957-both were undertaken when foreign backing for the regime’s domestic policy seemed secure.

Case: late eighties/ early nineties.

Background and Pre-mobilization Observations

There had been some suggestions of a move towards full parliamentary elections, but few concrete steps. On the whole, party activity was still repressed and officially illegal. The Muslim Brotherhood, although more accommodated than other major dissident groups such as the Arab Nationalists, was repressed somewhat more after 1985 as the regime sought better relations with Syria (Satloff, 1986: 55). Jordan’s economy retained a structure that left it particularly vulnerable to changes related to the international political economy: as noted in 1978 by economists J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, ‘a rapid
change in the perspective of aid donors or in the propensity of
Jordanian workers to remit would cripple the economy' (quoted in

Economic austerity policy was implemented as a result of worsening
debt situation. Sharp price hikes took place in 1989. These were
followed by ‘bread and gasoline’ riots. Soon after these, King Hussein
held full parliamentary elections on nonparty basis. These ushered in
a parliament in which almost half the representatives were
‘oppositionists’, and most of these fell into the semi-official Muslim
Brotherhood bloc.

**External Patronage**

This was followed by the Gulf crisis (1990-1991), during which
Jordan was isolated internationally- the Jordanian regime lost the
support of many Arab states and faced punitive measures from them
in terms of expelled workers and lowered trade and tourism.

The combination of lowered oil worker remittance and lowered
foreign aid is essentially what makes this an external patron shift
unfavorable to the regime. This exacerbated resource problems facing
the Jordanian regime. Through the early eighties, Jordan’s debt had
been increasing as Arab foreign aid donors had not followed through
on promises of aid. As oil worker remittances flowing into Jordan’s
economy lowered substantially in the late eighties, an economic
austerity program was started. This included the price hikes that
sparked riots in southern Jordan in April of 1989. Over the Gulf crisis,
the support from foreign aid donors and expatriate workers suddenly
faced a tremendous drop.

Before the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, about 40% of Jordan’s
total domestic exports were directed to the Gulf states; about three-
quarters of the tourists who visited Jordan were from these states and
almost all the grants received by the kingdom came from the Gulf.
Also, tens of thousands of expatriate workers returned to Jordan and
the others stopped their work in Kuwait (Feiler. 1994:55).

Another scholar describes the massive galvanization to Jordanian
domestic dissent produced by the Gulf crisis: Saddam Husein
managed to combine ‘imperial pan-Arabism, new-found pan-Islam, and
vitriolic anti-Americanism’ (Baram: 1994: 136). His promise to
redistribute Arab wealth and liberate Palestine, backed by his sizeable
army and weapons stockpile, ‘proved unexpectedly strong medicine
for many in the region’ (Baram, 1994: 137). This ‘ignited the imagina-
tion of and united Arabs in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians
and Bedouin in Jordan, and even hard-line Muslim Brothers’ (ibid.). Thus, this was a situation in which the regime lost external patrons while domestic dissidents gained one.

**Dissident Mobilization**

On September 10, 1990, the Muslim Brotherhood organized a pro-Iraq rally of 70,000 demonstrators in Amman. On September 28, 1990, a similar Brotherhood-organized rally of 40,000 demonstrators took place in Irbid the second largest Jordanian city. Popular dissident activity of this scale in Jordan was unprecedented.

**Post-mobilization Observations**

King Hussein convened a Congress of Popular Forces in Jordan, including his ‘archenemies’ George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh, and on January 1, 1991, the regime went so far as to incorporate five members of the Muslim Brotherhood into the new government (i.e., the Brothers were given Cabinet positions, a very significant concession because it meant executive policy-making authority) (Baram, 1994: 137). Political parties were then legalized in 1992. In 1993, the first multiparty elections in 26 years were held. However, what appears to be a broad accommodation (the legalization of political parties) was actually a strategic regime action designed to balance the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, what might be described as an ‘increase the opposition to weaken the opposition strategy’ (Thompson, 1997). Therefore, this is a clear change in the mix of repression and accommodation used by the regime towards dissidents but not as purely accommodative as a superficial description might suggest.

**Implications for the hypothesis:**

This case offers net support for H1. Prior to the unfavorable external patron shift, the regime had already made a significant accommodative move by allowing full parliamentary elections, albeit on a nonparty basis. There was an ‘unfavorable external patron shift’ as many states cut off support for the Jordanian regime and dissidents simultaneously gained a patron in Saddam Hussein’s new pan-Islamism. The dissident mobilization was followed by clear concessions (Muslim Brothers in the cabinet) and some apparent accommodation (the legalization of political parties in 1992). The legalization of political parties from the perspective of non-Islamist Jordanian dissidents (such as Arab Nationalists and Communists) was clearly an increase in accommodation. However, for the reasons mentioned above, party legalization was not as purely accommodative
as it appears. Additionally, the 1993 parliamentary elections were preceded by a voting rule change from ‘unlimited list voting’ to the ‘single non-transferable vote’ (SNTV) system. Historically, SNTV has made it very difficult to organize party votes. While political parties were legal, substantial obstacles prevented them from obtaining more representation in Parliament. Thus, it is difficult to characterize the change in the repression-accommodation mix in straightforward terms. The regime response was clearly not repression of the form associated with martial law and severely curtailed freedoms. It is probably best described as a moderate increase in accommodation. It may be possible to characterize this as the outcome of a “learning process” by the regime, compared to its extremely vulnerable early days in the volatile 50’s, where strong dissident mobilization was met with martial law, the response in the 90’s is more sophisticated and complex, relying on the finer manipulation of institutional rules rather than brute force.

Some discussion of results:
I have variation on both my dependent and independent variables and the data initially shows support for the research hypotheses. However, this is a very ‘blunt’ result suggesting the need for further refinement in my model’s specification of variables and potential causal paths. Better specification of these is also likely to make additional research on the experience of other countries easier.

One interesting result that has emerged from this work has been that the regime has successfully located powerful foreign backers prior to major repressions. This was the ease in the 1957 repression, as the guarantee of American support under the Eisenhower doctrine empowered the Jordanian regime to act against dissidents despite the support they received from Nasser. In the ease of the 1970 repression, there are some indications suggesting that the Jordanian regime only acted against the Palestinian fighters after it felt that it had secure guarantees of Western support. At this point, I don’t have the historical evidence to back up this claim. If true, however, then the explanation of ‘changes in the repression -accommodation mix’ needs to be modified to include the regime’s success or failure at locating external patrons.

Conclusions:
This has been a very exploratory project, designed to shed light on what is do-able in terms of the theoretical literature and available research materials for my dissertation. The research hypotheses make
intuitive sense; we expect that a regime weakened by the withdrawal of foreign support or by active foreign backing of dissidents is more likely to be forced to accommodate dissident demands in order to stave off revolutionary pressure, while a regime that feels secure about its external patrons is more likely to feel secure in repressing dissidents. For future research, two steps in particular suggest themselves.

Firstly, the hypothesis should be tested on a case where the country of focus is not as 'penetrated' and vulnerable to the international environment as Jordan, i.e., a country constituting a 'less likely case'. This is the logical step given that we have received supporting results in the 'most likely case'. This will help in establishing the generalizability of the hypothesis.

Secondly, external patronage for regimes and dissidents are only part of the story. It was never the claim that all major regime policy shifts could be explained by external patronage changes. The hypothesis should be broadened to from 'external patronage' to 'relative resource position' as the best explanatory variable for understanding major changes in regime-dissident relations. In fact, the logical link behind the external patronage shift ==> regime-dissident relations shift link is based on the idea that there is a change in the resources available to dissidents and to regimes. A sharp increase in the resources available to regimes should in theory enable it to act in ways it couldn’t before. Likewise, a sharp increase in the resources available to dissidents should provide them with possibilities for mobilization that didn’t previously exist.

Therefore, it makes sense to generalize the hypothesis and broaden the X and Y variables so that the hypothesis looks more like:

relative resources shift ==> dissident mobilization ==> regime-dissident relations shift.

Such a conceptualization allows us to include for the possibility that regimes respond to security threats posed by dissidents by 'shopping around' for foreign backers. If regimes feel secure that they have located a reliable and powerful external backer, then they will be more willing to take punitive measures. For both regimes and dissidents, gaining external patrons are clearly a significant means of locating the resources needed for collective action particularly in 'penetrated' settings. Dissidents are more likely to have their demands accommodated if they have acquired a powerful foreign backer and the regime has not. We expect that the actors most successful at locating external patrons will enjoy more favorable outcomes.
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Bibliography


